

New approaches to mechanism design

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Lecture 1: We will discuss briefly Maskin's theorem, one of the basic results in Nash Implementation theory. We will then proceed to Kurai and Yildiz (2013) which introduces an alternative concept to Nash Implementation.

Chapter 10 in Osborne Martin and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A course in Game Theory, MIT Press.

Download for free from <http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/arielDocs/>

Kurai, Semi and Kemal Yildiz (2013), Implementation via Codes of Rights. <https://files.nyu.edu/ky455/public/CodesofRights.pdf>

Lecture 2: We will discuss Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) which is an example of a behavioral economics approach to mechanism design.

Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (1998), "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions". Journal of Economic Theory, 79, 157-173.

<http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/57.pdf>

Lecture 3: We will discuss Glazer and Rubinstein (2006)'s mechanism design model which is related to Pragmatics. It will also be used to analyze the role of Experimental Economics in our theoretical work.

Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (2006). "A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach", Theoretical Economics, 1, 395-410.

<http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/70.pdf>

Lecture 4: A new approach to mechanism design and Bounded Rationality will be presented using Glazer and Rubinstein (2012).

Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (2012). "A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent", Journal of Political Economy.

<http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/GlazerRubinstein2011.pdf>